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In Inherently Safer Design (ISD) of a Process design, it’s goal is to eliminate or 
reduce a process's hazard. This paper discusses and prove on the simplification 
approach of ISD in reducing the failure frequency in a complexity of Independent 
Protection Layers (IPLs). Nevertheless challenging the concept of Layer of 
Protection Analysis (LOPA) that suggests that the more IPLs installed, the safer it is. 
On the other hand, This paper suggests total number of IPLs needed in a system can 
be limited into certain tolerable amount but still theoretically safe. By isolating the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In order to complete the study in Chemical Engineering Degree, students need to 
take Final Year Project (FYP) course. FYP comprises of total 6 credit hours and it is 
a individual project-based course. The final year project is divided into two phase; 
FYP1 during the 8th semester and FYP2 in the 9th semester of the undergraduate 
program. This project is an individual research project in connection with a special 
engineering problem and under the guidance of a faculty member. The purpose of  
the project is to develop a framework, which will enhance students' skills in the 
process of applying knowledge, expanding thoughts, solving problems independently 
and presenting findings through minimum guidance and supervision. The topic was 
proposed by a senior lecturer, Dr. Risza Binti Rusli and eventually will be the 

















1.1 Background Of Study 
Inherent means existing as essential constituent or characteristic, something 
intrinsic. Therefore, something is inherent if it exists "as an essential 
constituent or characteristics." When something is inherently safer. safety is 
built into the process or product not added on. Hazards are eliminated not 
controlled, and the means by which the hazards are eliminated are so 
fundamental to the process design that they cannot be changed or defeated 
without changing the process. 
In many cases, this will result in simpler and less costly plants. If extensive 
safety systems are required to control major hazards, they introduce 
complexity, along with cost, both in the initial investment for the safety 
equipments as well as for ongoing operating cost for maintenance and 
operation. 
Because ISD's goal is to eliminate or reduce a process's hazards one must 
understand the term hazard. In this context, the definition from CCPS's 
(2008) Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures is used. According to 
this source, a hazard is " an inherent physical or chemical characteristics that 
has the potential for causing harm to people, environment or property." 
(Hendershot, 2011) 
Inherently Safer Design (ISD) is a philosophy of addressing safety issues in 
the  design and operation facilities that use or process hazardous 
chemicals. A facilities  considering ISD will try to manage process risk 
within the design by eliminating or  significantly reducing hazards. Where 
feasible, ISD provides more robust and reliable risk management, and has the 
potential to make the  processing technology simpler and economical by 
eliminating the need for expensive safety systems and procedures.  
Thus, it brings us to the chemical process safety strategies to achieve ISD 
where the first three can be characterized as engineering controls; Inherent, 
Passive, Active, while the last (procedural) can be categorized as an 
administrative control. Nevertheless a combination of ISD, engineering and 
administrative controls will  always be required to manage all the process 
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risks. Thus, CCPS (2009) has categorized strategies for designing inherently 
safer process into four groups; namely substitute, minimize, moderate and 
simplification. 
Some issues come up from the first three; substitute, minimize and moderate 
having almost similar strategies where it involved directly on the materials or 
chemical involved in the process. Substitution involve the use of less 
hazardous materials chemistry and processes, minimization is the reducing of 
quantities of hazardous materials or size of operating equipment under 
hazardous condition while moderation involving the reduction of hazards by 
dilution, refrigeration or process alternatives that operate at less hazardous 
condition. 
On the other hand, the last strategy, simplification require the avoidance of 
complexities such as multiproduct or multiunit operations or congested pipe 
or unit settings. Taking Bhopal tragedy for example, the not maintained well 
system is most likely the reason the event to be occur. the In this paper, we 
will be focusing on this particular simplification strategies to come up with 













1.2  Problem Statement 
Inherent safety is a proactive approach for loss prevention and risk 
management. Considering the lifetime costs of a process and its operation, an 
inherent safety approach can lead to a cost-optimal option. Inherent safety 
may be achieved at any stage of process design; however, its application at 
the early stages of process design yields the best results. Despite being an 
attractive and cost-effective approach, the inherent safety methodology is not 
widely used. Many reasons have been attributed to this lack of widespread 
use, the non-availability of systematic tools for the application of inherent 
safety principles and index being too human bias subjective is perhaps one of 
the important reason. (Khan & Amyotte, 2004)  
The basis of the research is that simpler plant or system provide fewer 
opportunities for error. This is because taking human nature as one of the 
factor, most people will tends to go for simpler solutions. For example, an 
operator who is on the task in the operational field, will have the tendencies 
to violate the procedures of a complex procedures and instrumentation as 
long as the result of the action improvised is the same. Taking Bhopal tragedy 
as an example, the plant was supposed to produced 1/3 of the product 
produced. The over  yield of product to satisfy the profit that they might get 
and also too many safety system were shut down to lower down the 
operational cost made the tragedy more costly than they ever imagined. This 
shows how a complex system might led people to a shortcut and finally an 
error. How to judge the complexity of a process in a plant is what we are 
trying to figure out. 
In a context of simplification, CCPS suggested that such added-on barriers or 
complex safety system have disadvantages such as the barrier can be 
expensive to design, build and maintain and the hazard is still present in the 
process, where failures of enough layers of protection can still result in an 
incident. Therefore, it is better applying the inherently safer concepts to the 




1.3 Objectives & Scope Of Study 
From the literature review of past researches, we come up with some 
objectives: 
i. To develop Complexity Index using Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Approach. 
ii. To test the capability of the developed complexity index. 
iii. To validate the result from the test with the previous work. 
 The scope of the study will be solely on using the simplification strategy in 
developing complexity index together with LOPA and Fault Tree Analysis 
approach on a particular system, and the complexity calculations will be 
focusing on the usage of Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and Basic Process 
Control System (BPCS) in a system as Independent Protection Layers which 
















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
Throughout this project, some literature reviews were made to gain more 
understanding on the subject that matters. For example, for the first five review is 
about the importance of applying inherently safer design with the known strategies. 
Some of it is about the understanding of the essentials understanding on when to 
apply the inherently safer design concept throughout the process life cycle. 
Nevertheless, discussion on misconception of inherently safer design that only deal 
with consequences.   
During the early realization of the importance of process safety in industry, indices 
have been proposed from time to time for hazard identification for process safety 
purposes. Noteworthy among them are the Dow fire and explosion index, Dow 
chemical exposure index,  the Mond fire, explosion and toxicity index, FTA, LOPA, 
QI2SD and I2SI. A few rapid ranking techniques and databases have also been 
proposed. (Khan, Husain, & Abbasi, 2001) The importance of quantification certain 
measures were the first idea on why indices and representative value are being 
invented. 
2.1 Inherently Safer design, An Overview of Key Elements 
The paper is discussing that inherently safer design is a holistic approach to 
safer chemical manufacture. In the paper, some overview on key elements of 
ISD such as minimize, substitute, moderate and simplify were discussed. 
Nevertheless the process's lifecycle is also considered in context of ISD to 
further explain the most effective use of ISD as well as other risk mitigation 
methods and strategies. (Hendershot, 2011) 
Nevertheless, the paper discussing on categorization of chemical process 
safety strategies in four categories. 
    
Figure 1: Chemical Process Safety Strategies 
Inherent Passive Active Procedural
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The first three can be categorized as engineering controls, while the last 
(procedural ) can be categorized as an administrative control. 
While some more categorization of strategies for designing inherently safer 
design  was made into four groups which is substitute, minimize, moderate 
and simplify. Whereas, Simplification will become the highlight strategy that 
will be discussed later in results and discussions. 
 
2.2 Implementing Inherent Safety throughout Process Lifecycle 
In this paper the problems of implementing inherent safety evaluations and 
their accuracies in process lifecycle are discussed. For this purpose more 
closer look on what are the lifecycle phases and how the amount of the 
knowledge on the process will increase during the design. 
 
 
Figure 2: The design paradox and inherently safer design 
The paper concluded that the major decision on process principle are done in 
the process development and conceptual design phases. The most crucial 
thing in process design concerning safety is getting the fundamentals right as 
early as possible. As design project proceeds, it becomes more and more 





2.3 Inherently Safer Design - Not Only About Reducing Consequences!  
Process risk is the function of both probability or likelihood of occurrence of 
an incident, and also the consequences of the incident.(Hendershot, 2011) 
Risk = Likelihood x Consequence 
There is common misconception that inherently safer design only focuses 
solely on the mitigating part by reducing or eliminating the consequences. 
This kind of misconception lead to increasing number of layer of protection 
that will cost more to reduce or to mitigate consequence instead of using 
prevention to reduce the likelihood of occurrence. 
Some examples of ways to reducing likelihood were explained in certain 
conditions such as how to reduce the likelihood of reverse flow, excess feed 
rate to a semi-batch reactor, and using a non-reactive heat transfer fluid. 
 
2.4 Process Intensification Safety Pros and Cons  
The paper is discussing on how process intensification (PI) has the potential 
to be significant factor in the implementation of inherently safety. (Etchells, 
2005 ) 
PI is one way in which the inventory of such hazardous substances, and the 
consequences of a process failure, may be incomparably reduced. The paper 
also discusses the potential for PI to improve process safety, and some of the 
possible shortcomings, which should be studied in the light of the legal 
framework. 
Process Intensification are best quoted by Profesor Trevoz Kletz (1991) , 
'What you don't have, can't leak!'. Thus we can say, for a hazardous process 
that having a simpler independent protection layer will have much lesser 
frequency to leak  rather than system with a high complexity.   
Some of the potential problems form process intensification were discussed in 
the paper.  Even though in some cases, PI will reduce capital cost and allow 
new or better products to be produced, some PI technologies may require 
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high-energy inputs to achieve that. Consequently, the high -energy sources 
may introduce new hazards. Thus this paper suggesting that PI has the 
potential to be a major factor to implement inherent safety but it needs to be 
considered as part of the balanced risk assessment of the plant and process 
involved. (Etchells, 2005) 
 
2.5 Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI)  
SWeHI intents at administering a view as a whole of the industry or the 
desired process unit, with the regards to the hazards posed by under a given 
set of external forcing factors such as meteorology and social catastrophes. In 
the same time, it integrates this information with the safety measures. 
In quantitative terms, SWeHI represents the radius of the area under moderate 
hazard (50% probability of fatality/damage) due to the given unit/plant 
considering the chemicals, operating conditions, environmental setting, etc. 
involved at that instant. In mathematical terms it is represented as: 
SWeHI = B/A 
Where, B is the quantitative measure of the damage that may be caused by a 
unit/plant. It is measured in terms of area under 50% probability of damage, 
A represents the credits due to control measures and safety arrangements 
made to counter the undesirable situations. (Khan, 2001) 
 




2.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index (Dow FEI) 
The most widely used hazard index and is commonly referred as the Dow 
Index. It was first reported in 1964. Since then it has evolved into 
progressively more advanced versions. 
The Dow FEI relies on the calculation of a fire and explosion index which is 
then used to estimates fire protection measures and, in combination with a 
damage factor, to derive the base maximum probable property damage 
(MPPD).  
The index is calculated as follows. First, a material factor (MF) is obtained. It 
is a measure of the potential energy released from the material. It is 
determined by considering the flammability and reactivity of the material and 
has a range of 1 - 40. Then, two penalty factors (F1 and F2), one for general 
process hazards (GPHs) and one for special process hazards (SPHs), 
respectively, are determined. Next, the process unit hazards factor (PUHF), 
which is the product of these, is calculated. The Dow FEI is obtained as the 
product of the MF and PUHF. 
GPHs are sums of the penalties due to the type of reaction/process, type of 
chemical handled in the process unit, and drainage and spill control factors of 
the chemical. SPHs account for the factors due to operation under hazardous 
conditions, quantity of chemical handled in the unit, and the characteristics of 
the chemical. Using these three parameters (MF, SPHs, GPHs), MPPD is 
estimated. Next, utilizing credits for hazard control strategies and safety 
systems, the `actual probable property damage’ (APPD) is calculated. The 
damage radius is derived empirically from the Dow FEI by using the 
following equation (Khan et al., 2001): 





2.7  The Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index (Mond FETI) 
 The Mond FETI is an extension of the Dow Index. The Mond FETI was 
developed at the Mond division of ICI. The Mond FETI involves making an 
initial assessment of hazard in a manner similar to that used in the Dow FEI, 
but taking into account additional hazard considerations. The potential hazard 
is expressed in terms of the initial value of a set of indices for fire, explosion 
and toxicity The material factor is determined as in the Dow method, but in 
addition, special material hazard factors are introduced. Again, as in the Dow 
method, use is made of factors for GPHs and SPHs, although some other 
factors are also incorporated. For example, a quantity factor, based on the 
inventory of material, and a layout hazard factor are introduced. There are 
also factors for toxicity hazard. The toxicity index is calculated using the 
health factor, quantity of chemical in use and the toxicological properties of 
the chemical. In the second edition and subsequent amendments of the Mond 
Index, factors which offset hazards were brought into account. These include 
preventive measures to reduce the frequency of incidents, and mitigation of 
consequences. These `offsetting factors’ are used in the computation of the 
final values of indices. (Khan et al., 2001) 
 
2.8 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 FTA is an analytical method for characterizing the occurrence of a specified, 
undesired event (Top Event) using a graphic model (the Fault Tree) which 
represents the logical combination of basic (low-level) events resulting in the 
occurrence of the Top Event. 
The Fault Tree is a graphic "model" of the potential pathways in a complex 
system which can lead to a foreseeable undesired event.  The pathways 
interconnect several kind of contributory events and conditions, using the 
Boolean Algebra logic symbols (AND, OR, etc.).  The Fault Tree Analysis 
uses numerical single probabilities of occurrence of the basic events 
(Component reliability data, or failure data) to evaluate the propagation 
12 
 
through the model and eventually assess the expected frequency of the Top 
Event.  A "typical" Fault Tree is presented in figure below. 
 
Figure 4: Fault Tree Example 
2.9 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Inherently Safer Processes  
 CCPS  presented a model for typical layers of  protection in a chemical plant 
(Figure 1). Each layer of protection is a barrier to prevent undesired impact  
events from reaching people,  the environment, or equipment that could be 
injured or damaged. No layer of protection is perfect; every layer has some 
probability of failure on demand (PFD) 
 




LOPA concept can be summarized as:  
1. Identify impact events, determine the type of  impact (people, environment, 
property), and classify for severity,  
2. List the causes for each impact event,  
3. Estimate the frequency of each initiating cause  
4. List independent protection layers for each  
5. Determine the probability of failure on demand  cause-consequence pair,  
 (PFD) for each IPL, 
6. Calculate the mitigated event frequency for each cause-consequence pair 
by multiplying the initiating event frequency by the PFD for each of the 
applicable IPLS.  
7. Compare the mitigated event frequency to the criteria for tolerable risk.  
(Arthur, 1999) 
The  LOPA  method  was  primarily  developed  in  the  context  of  denoting  
Safety  Integrity  Levels (SILs)  for  electronic/electronic/programmable  
electronic  safety  related  systems. LOPA proved to make consistent 
decisions  on the adequacy of the  existing or proposed individual protection 
layers (IPLs) against top events or accident scenarios.  
LOPA is based on the computation of  single event- consequence scenarios. 
Started with initial event and end with consequence. Through different 
initiating events that can lead to the same consequence, all these events must 
be included to develop scenarios for consecutive assessment. 
 
 
Figure 6: LOPA scenario 
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2.10 Quantitative Index of Inherently Safer Design (QI2SD) 
QI2SD  comprises of three key steps: quantify inherent hazards, evaluate 
inherent  safety conflicts in the design alternatives which have been 
generated according to ISD  concept and rank the ISD alternatives for 
decision making.  (Rusli, Shariff, & Khan, 2013).  
The methodology identifies potential ISD option by  estimating the potential 
damage  and evaluating hazard conflicts that could be transferred to 
other parts of the  process after IS principles are considered. The case 
 study shows that a micro reactor  option can be considered as an 
inherently safer reactor for nitration of the toluene  process provided that the 
hazard conflict levels in  moderation and simplification  principles 
have been taken into account to reduce the risk of fire and explosion. 
 QI2SD tool is able to indicate the potential hazards and conflicts in the design 
 based on inherent safety point of view.(Rusli et al., 2013) 
2.11 Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) 
The paper presented the conceptual framework of I2SI. The name integrated 
index was named due to  the procedure, when fully developed, is intended to 
consider the life cycle of the process with economic evaluation and hazard 
potential identification for each option.  
I2SI = ISPI 
        HI 
As shown, I2SI is composed of two main sub-indices which are: Hazard Index 
(HI) and Inherent Safety Potential Index (ISPI).  The Hazard index is meant for 
the measure of the damage potential of the process after taking into account the 
process and hazard control measure. The ISPI on the contrary accounts for the 
applicability of the inherent safety principles ( or guidewords) to the process. 
Both ISPI and HI are range from 1 to 200. Finally after the calculations, if the 
I2SI value greater than unity,  it denotes a positive response of the inherent 




From the  literature reviews above, we could say the relevancy recentness and are in 
a good position for the project to be executed. From the paper mentioned above, the 
importance of inherently safer design in a process life cycle are well discussed. 
Nevertheless the essence of indexing of one system with numerical to denotes certain 






































Figure 7: Methodology 
Referring the figure 2 above, the methodology will be proceed firstly by selecting 
hazardous process in a plant, containing hazard materials or a process that could 
bring hazardous result if something went wrong. From the process hazard selection, 
identification of present SIS and BPCS are taken into account. Next, the complexity 
index that will be constructed so a relationship between the present SIS and BPCS 
with probability taken from general Fault Tree Analysis of the hazardous process 
will be evaluated. The evaluation will then be compare with acceptable criteria and 
previous study with similar hazardous process that undergone a different index study 
to be compared to validate our index.  
 
Start 
Select  Hazardous Process 
(Top Events) 
Identify Process Components 
(SIS and BPCS) that could 
lead to the top event 
Quantification of each events 




(add or reduce IPL 




Compare total frequency with 
acceptable criteria 
Calculate the total frequency 
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CHAPTER 4 : RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
4.1 Case Study 1: Overpressure of Reactor 
 
Figure 8: A chemical reactor with an alarm and an inlet feed solenoid. The 
alarm and feed shutdown systems are linked in parallel 
A diagram of the safety systems in a certain chemical reactor is shown in. This 
reactor  contains a high-pressure alarm to alert the operator in the event of dangerous 
reactor pressures. It  consists of a pressure switch within the reactor connected to an 
alarm light indicator. For additional  safety an automatic high-pressure reactor 
shutdown system is installed. This system is activated at a pressure somewhat higher 
than the alarm system and consists of a pressure switch connected to a solenoid valve 
in the reactor feed line. The automatic system stops the flow of reactant in the event 
of dangerous pressures. (Crowl et al., 2011) 
Using the table below, we calculate the reliability and failure probabilities of each 
component using: 
R(t) = e-μt  , 








Table 1: Failure rate Data for Various Selected Process Components 
 
 





P= 1 - R 
Pressure switch 1 0.14 0.87 0.13 
Alarm Indicator 0.044 0.96 0.04 
Pressure switch 2 0.14 0.87 0.13 
Solenoid Valve 0.42 0.66 0.34 
 
From the case study, we identified the top events that could happened from the 





Figure 9: Fault Tree for case study 
 
Next, a quantification of the probability will be calculated. For this case:  
P(l AND 3) = (0.13)(0.13) = 0.0169 
P(2 AND 3) = (0.04)(0.13) = 0.0052 
P(l AND 4) = (0.13)(0.34) = 0.0442 
P(2 AND 4) = (0.04)(0.34) = 0.0136 
           Total = 0.0799 







The next step is to compare the likelihood / total probabilities with the likelihood 
ratings as shown in table below:  
Table 2: Likelihood ratings ( US Department of Defense, 2000) 
 
Referring to the table, the current likelihood is in the High likelihood of occurence.  
Based on the Risk Matrix/ ALARP acceptable likelihood region, (Little, 2007-2009) 
moderate frequency is tolerable with add-on and safety measure, low frequency is 
tolerable even without add-on and safety measure while high frequency is 
intolerable. 
From the definition above it is assumed, medium frequency which is 10-2  > P > 10-3  
and by using equation from (Summers, 1998); 
Probability to fail on demand =  Tolerable risk frequency 
               Process demand 
Since our scope are only including likelihood of occurrence before the top event, 
without the consequence included, the equation become; 
 
Risk Reduction Factor = Likelihood of Occurrence 
        Acceptable Likelihood 
 
In this case study, taking 10-2 as acceptable likelihood in the moderate region,  
Risk Reduction Factor = 7.99 x 10-2 
           1 x 10-2 
    = 7.99 
The essence of the calculation is, the closer the likelihood of occurrence to the 
acceptable likelihood, then no more addition or reducing of IPL is needed where an 
unnecessary complexity can be avoided. In this case study, it shows that the 
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probability to fail is too far from the acceptable likelihood. Thus, an addition of IPL 
are needed until the probability is close to 1. 
Table 3: Complexity Index 
RRF Value Complexity Indications 
RRF < 1 High Reduction of IPL are needed  
RRF = 1 Recommended No further adding or reducing IPL needed 






4.2  Case Study 2: BP Texas  
 
Figure 10: Raffinate Section of ISOM Unit, BP Texas (CSB, 2007) 
On March 23, 2005 at 1:20 PM, The accident occurred during the start up of the 
ISOM unit resulting 15 fatalities, 180 injuries and $1.5 billion financial loss (CSB, 
2007). A brief explanation of the accident described below. 
On February 21, 2005 the raffinate section of the ISOM unit was shut down and the 
raffinate splitter tower was drained, gas freed and steamed out. The accident 
occurred during the start-up of the ISOM unit. During start up on March 23, due to 
faulty readings from the level transmitter ,the raffinate tower was overfilled. The 
release of a flammable liquid geyser from the blowdown drum which was not 
equipped with flare resulting from the Pressure relief devices opened overfilling the 










Table 4: Failure Probabilities of the ISOM unit safety barriers 






1 Excess feed loading 0.08 9.13E-06 
2 Failure of level transmitter 0.01 1.14E-06 
3  Failure of High Level Alarm 0.15 1.71E-05 
4 Failure of level site glass 0.1 1.14E-05 
5 Failure of high-high level alarm 0.15 1.71E-05 
6 Failure of heavy raffinate level control valve 0.02 2.28E-06 
7 Failure of manual chain valve bypassing the three relief valves 0.2 2.28E-05 
8 Failure of first automatic safety valve (set at 40 psig 0.015 1.71E-06 
9 Failure of second automatic safety valve (set at 41 psig) 0.015 1.71E-06 
10 Failure of third automatic safety valve (set at 42 psig) 0.015 1.71E-06 
11 Failure of 1.5 inch reflux bypass valve 0.02 2.28E-06 
12 Failure of safety relief valve 0.015 1.71E-06 
13 Failure of vent and purge valve 0.02 2.28E-06 
14 Failure of 6 inch manual block valve chained open 0.2 2.28E-05 
15 Failure of high level alarm 0.15 1.71E-05 
16 Failure of level site glass 0.1 1.14E-05 
17 Failure of Manual block valve kept closed 0.2 2.28E-05 
18 Failure of ESD valve 0.2 2.28E-05 
Source: Plant specific data, safety expert feedback. (Kalantarnia et.al, 2010)  
From the lists of failure probabilities of the ISOM unit safety barriers, a diagram of 
fault tree analysis were created using the AND and OR gate as below:  
 




                                                                              
 
Figure 12: FTA Calculations from www.fault-tree-analysis-software.com 
From the result of the FTA calculation using www. fault-tree-analysis-software.com, 
it is found that the total frequency result to be: 2.08E-7 . As the basis of the 
calculation was using per hour, the result need to be multiplied by the number of 
hours in a year: 




𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 1.82 × 10−3 
Probability to fail on demand =  Tolerable risk frequency 
               Process demand 
Since our scope are only including likelihood of occurrence before the top event, 
without the consequence included, the equation become; 
 
Risk Reduction Factor = Likelihood of Occurrence 





In this case study, taking 10-2 as acceptable likelihood in the moderate region,  
Risk Reduction Factor = 1.82 × 10−3 
           1 x 10-2 
    = 0.182 
The essence of the calculation is, the closer the likelihood of occurrence to the 
acceptable likelihood, then no more addition or reducing of IPL is needed where an 
unnecessary complexity can be avoided. In this case study, it shows that the 
probability close to the acceptable likelihood however still less than the preferred 



















CHAPTER 5 :CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 
In conclusion, the case study and the literature review shown are both shows the 
index are working. For the simpler case study of overpressure, it is proven the 
example is too simple thus additional of IPL so the preferable probability can be 
achieve. While for the second case study of BP Texas which was known as one of 
the accident that contributed by the high level of complexity in the instrumentations 
of the plant. The result and application of the index proven that the case study result 
shows the high complexity of the plant IPLs.  
 This index could help personnel and management of plant in some ways for 
example the installation of IPLs could be limited to only until the requirements 
acceptable frequency. This in a way will help to reduce the costing of a plant design 
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Appendix 1: Risk Matrix / ALARP Region 
 
 
Appendix 2: BOWTIE Diagram on Prevention and Mitigation Barriers 
 
 
 
